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Abstract. In USENIX Security 08, Juels, Pappu and Parno proposed a
secret sharing based mechanism to alleviate the key distribution problem
in RFID-enabled supply chains. Compared to existing pseudonym based
RFID protocols, the secret sharing based solution is more suitable for
RFID-enabled supply chains since it does not require a database of keys
be distributed among supply chain parties for secure ownership transfer
of RFID tags. However, this mechanism cannot resist tag tracking and
tag counterfeiting attacks in supply chain systems. It is also not conve-
nient for downstream supply chain parties to adjust the size of RFID
tag collections in recovering tag keys. To address these problems, we
propose a ﬂexible and secure secret update protocol which enables each
supply chain party to update tag keys in a secure and eﬃcient manner.
Our proposal enhances the previous secret sharing based mechanism in
that it not only solves the ﬂexibility problem in unidirectional key dis-
tribution, but also ensures the security for ownership transfer of tags in
RFID-enabled supply chains.
1 Introduction
Radio-frequency identiﬁcation (RFID) is a wireless Automatic Identiﬁcation and
Data Capture (AIDC) technology that has been widely deployed in many appli-
cations including supply chain management. While RFID technology facilitates
eﬃcient management of RFID tags, it also triggers privacy concerns since sensi-
tive information about RFID tags may be collected by an adversary via wireless
communication channel without their owner’s awareness. To prevent RFID tags
from unwanted readouts, various solutions have been proposed in the literature.
One solution is to send a Kill command [2] to a tag so that the tag is “dead”
to any queries. Another solution is to physically clip a tag’s antenna so that
the tag is silenced [7]. Juels, Rivest and Szydlo introduced the blocker tag [6],
which generates a signal that collides with all tags to be protected. Once the
blocker tag is removed or disabled, however, the privacy of the protected tags
may be disclosed. To make RFID tags always readily responsible, Fishkin, Roy
S. Qing, C.J. Mitchell, and G. Wang (Eds.): ICICS 2009, LNCS 5927, pp. 150–164, 2009.
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and Jiang [3] proposed a distance-based access control scheme in which the tags
reply with diﬀerent levels of details depending on their distance to the reader,
assuming that an adversary cannot get close enough to a tag as an authorized
reader. However, it is diﬃcult to prevent an adversary from getting close to
a tag in many applications; consequently, the adversary may obtain sensitive
information about some tags.
To address this concern, many protocols based on pseudonymous ID have
been proposed [5], including the hash-lock of Weis et al. [15], the hash chain
of Ohkubo, Suzuki and Kinoshita [12], the tree-based proposal of Molnar and
Wagner [11], and many randomized pseudonym-based protocols such as the
one proposed by Li and Ding [10]. In such protocols, each tag is associated
with a pseudonymous ID. An authorized reader can identify the tag from its
pseudonyms because it has access to a database that maps each tag’s pseudonym
to its real ID based on a secret key. Without the database, an adversary cannot
identify a tag nor track it from its pseudonyms (which may change from time
to time). When the tagged items change their ownership in a supply chain, the
database needs to be transferred so that the new owner can recognize the tags ac-
cording to the database. How to eﬃciently distribute the database among autho-
rized parties is critical for applying pseudonym based protocols in RFID-enabled
supply chains. Since the database consists of the keys for all tags, this problem is
essentially a key distribution problem to be addressed in RFID-enabled supply
chains.
In supply chain practice, especially for dynamic or ad hoc supply chain struc-
ture, the parties in supply chain are usually lack of secure network connections.
A practical solution to the key distribution problem is to split a tag key into a
number of shares and store the shares to multiple tags. Since the tag keys are
stored in the tags directly, an authorized reader/party can collect enough shares
and recover the keys, while an adversary is assumed to have limited access to
the tags such that he/she cannot collect enough shares for recovering the keys.
In this solution, there is no need of distributing a key database among supply
chain parties. This secret sharing based solution is thus particularly useful for
protecting dynamic and ad hoc supply chains.
A recent work in this direction is conducted by Juels, Pappu and Parno [4],
which we call Juels-Pappu-Parno key sharing mechanism, or JPP mechanism for
short. In this solution, a common key k of a batch of tags is split with a (τ, n)-
secret sharing scheme, and each tag Ti stores a share Si of k and its individual
(encrypted) information Mi. A reader can recover k with access to at least τ
shares. From k and Mi, a reader can decrypt the information about tag Ti. The
reader is referred to Section 2.3 for more details about the JPP mechanism. This
proposal does not restrict on the time period in which a tag should be read, or
the number of the tags which should be attached to an item; thus, it is considered
to be the only secret sharing based solution that is suitable for RFID-enabled
supply chains.
However, the JPP mechanism is not secure in that a tag always sends a
constant reply to any query. As a result, the tag is vulnerable to tracking by
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either supply chain parties or outsiders. Also, an adversary can impersonate a
tag in replay attack. When the tagged items are handed over from upstream
parties to downstream parties in a supply chain, the downstream parties need
to adjust the threshold in key recovery as they reassemble the collection/batch
of tagged items. The JPP mechanism does not provide such ﬂexibility.
In this paper, we propose a secret update protocol to address the problems of
the JPP mechanism. Our secret update protocol enhances the security level of
the JPP mechanism against tracking and impersonation attacks. It also makes
it convenient for a supply chain party to adjust the threshold in key recovery
according to the size of each batch of tags to be processed. Our work enhances
the security and practicality of the JPP mechanism with reasonable cost paid
to increase the tag’s functionality.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the char-
acteristics of supply chain, the secret sharing approaches, and the JPP mecha-
nism. In Section 3, we elaborate on our secret update protocol. In Section 4, we
formally prove the security of our secret update protocol. At last, we conclude
this paper.
2 Reviews
In this section, we brieﬂy introduce the background knowledge about the security
requirements for RFID-enabled supply chains. We review several secret sharing
approaches and revisit the JPP mechanism.
2.1 Security Requirements for RFID-Enabled Supply Chains
As pointed out in [4], the requirements for any security mechanism in RFID-
enabled supply chains should be carefully deﬁned according to the supply chain
characteristics, which are summarized below.
 None pre-existing trust relationship: The two adjacent parties in a
supply chain may have no previous trust relationship. The current owner of
the tagged items may not always know which party will take over part or all
of the tagged items before it gets the order from the next party.
 Unidirectional downsizing: Items start oﬀ in large collections and pro-
gressively get whittled down into smaller aggregates as they make their way
from upstream parties to downstream parties.
 Compulsory processing orders: A batch of tags that are processed to-
gether by a downstream party must be processed together by an upstream
party.
As such, a schematic representing the de- & re-packing of a case containing
multiple item tags within a supply chain party is illustrated in Fig. 1 as our
running example: On receiving a case of 100 items transported from an upstream
party, the current owner disassembles the case into item-level tags. According to
some business orders from downstream parties, the owner then repackages those
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Fig. 1. De- & Re-packing of Item Tags in RFID-enabled Supply Chains. A case of
10× 10 items, transported from an upstream party, can be de-packed and re-packed by
the current owner. The newly packed cases are to be shipped out to the downstream
parties.
items into smaller cases with variable sizes and ships them out. Before shipping
out, the owner of the tags would most likely update the tags so that the smaller
batches can be eﬃciently authenticated by the downstream parties.
2.2 Secret Sharing Approaches
Till now, three secret sharing mechanisms [8,9,4] were proposed to solve the key
distribution problem in RFID-enabled supply chains.
The Shamir tag proposed by Langheinrich and Marti [8] is the ﬁrst proposal
in this direction. This solution splits the true ID of a tag using Shamir’s secret
sharing scheme [14] and stores all the shares on the tag itself. All the shares
form the new ID of a tag. Upon a reader’s inquiry, an initial set of random bits
from the new ID is released, following by subsequent throttled single-bit releases.
Eventually, all bits of the new ID will be released and only then can the true ID
be computed [8]. The security of this proposal is relevant to the time that an
adversary can access the tag. An RFID reader needs a suﬃcient period of time
to collect all bits of a tag’s new ID before it can recover the tag’s ture ID. The
time period is typically several minutes for reasonable security. The security of
this solution depends on the assumption that a “hit-and-run” adversary cannot
access a tag in a long enough time period to collect all bits of a tag’s new ID.
The problem is, in a supply chain, typically a large number of tags need to
be processed in an eﬃcient manner. It may not be practical to spend several
minutes to identify a tag. Although the initial set of random bits can be used for
fast identifying, it works only when the reader knows all tags’ new IDs and true
IDs. Since a database of tags is not distributed among supply chain parties (for
solving the key distribution problem), a new owner of the tags has no knowledge
about the tags’ new IDs. Therefore, the Shamir tag scheme is not practical for
ownership transfer in RFID-enabled supply chains.
Langheinrich and Marti have also extended Shamir’s scheme to distribute
an item’s ID over hundreds of tags that are attached to or integrated into the
item’s material [9]. This method may be suitable for protecting containers or
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large items; however, it is not practical to authenticate hundreds of tags for each
item in supply chains.
In USENIX Security 08, Juels, Pappu and Parno proposed a key sharing
mechanism (i.e., the JPP mechanism) [4] to enhance the practicality of the two
early secret sharing based solutions proposed by Langheinrich and Marti [8,9] by
removing the constraints on the period of each tag being read and the number
of tags attached to each item. The JPP mechanism is particularly eﬃcient for
ownership transfer in RFID-enabled supply chains since it eliminates the need
for distributing a database of tag keys among supply chain parties.
2.3 The JPP Mechanism
In the JPP-mechanism, a batch of tags share the same key k, which is split to
n shares using a (τ, n) threshold secret sharing (TSS) scheme [14], where τ < n
is a threshold. Anyone who collects at least τ shares can recover k. The JPP
mechanism provides two methods to implement the (τ, n)-TSS scheme.
The ﬁrst one is called “secret sharing across space” which uses Error Correct-
ing Code (ECC) to construct the (τ, n)-TSS scheme. Each tag Ti stores a share
si as well as its symmetrically encrypted information Ek(mi), where mi is the
information about the tag Ti. The tag Ti sends (si, Ek(mi)) to any reader who
queries it.
The other method is called “secret sharing across time”, which uses the
“Sliding-Window Information Secret Sharing” (SWISS) scheme to generate the
shares of a tag. Each tag stores values of (si1, si2, ri), where si1 and si2 are two
key shares, and ri is a tag-speciﬁc random number. One of key shares is used
to derive the common key k of the tags in the timing window to which tag Ti
belongs (the timing window determines which key share is used in deriving the
key). From k and ri, a reader can derive an individual key1 ki for each tag Ti,
which is used to symmetrically encrypt the tag information mi as Eki(mi).
We can see that the JPP mechanism is based on spreading a common secret
into diﬀerent tags. To summarize, we denote the tag’s content as (Si,Mi), where
Si represents the values used to derive the common key k, and Mi is the infor-
mation related to the tag Ti itself. In the “secret sharing across space” method,
we have Si = si and Mi = Ek(mi), while in the “secret sharing across time”
method, we have Si = si1‖si2 and Mi = ri‖Eki(mi), where ki is derived from
the common key k.
The JPP mechanism is secure under the assumption that an adversary cannot
get access to enough shares for recovering a tag key in the “open area” (e.g.,
retail stores or customer homes), while legitimate supply chain parties can collect
enough shares for recovering each tag key in the “closed area” of a supply chain,
to which the adversary does not have access.
1 Note that although in the “secret sharing across time” method, each tag has a
separate key ki, the key ki is derived from a common key k and ri as ki = h(ri, k),
where h is a hash function. Since ri is available to any reader, this method does
not provide any stronger security than the “secret sharing across space” method in
which all the tags shares a common key.
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3 Secret Updating for Unidirectional Key Distribution
3.1 Observations
One of the highlights of the JPP mechanism is that it is suitable for EPC-
global Class-1 Generation-2 tags. The reason is that JPP mechanism requires
no processing power on the tags and that the storage of EPCglobal Class-1
Generation-2 tags is enough to hold the tag information. This means that the
JPP mechanism can easily be deployed in current RFID systems without chang-
ing the requirements to the tags. It also eliminates the need of distributing a
database of tags among supply chain parties for eﬃcient ownership transfer in
RFID-enabled supply chains. However, we have two key observations over the
JPP mechanism.
Firstly, the adversary model of the JPP mechanism is not too strong in that
the tags are assumed to be secure within the “closed area” of a supply chain,
while the tags are exposed to an adversary only in the “open area.” In practice,
the security of supply chain is arguable; the parties in a dynamic or ad hoc
supply chain may not trust or even know each other before they transfer tags to
each other. It is more reasonable to assume that the adversary’s power is limited
rather than the tags are secure. Under this assumption, we have the following
security observation on the JPP mechanism.
Vulnerable to tracking: In the JPP mechanism, a tag Ti always sends the
same reply (Si,Mi) to any reader who queries it. Although an adversary
may not get enough shares to decrypt the content of the tag, the never-
changing reply can be used by the adversary to track the tag.
Vulnerable to counterfeiting: As the public accessible message (Si,Mi) is
used for a reader to identify the tag Ti, an adversary can easily fabricate a
tag that also sends (Si,Mi), and replace the tagged item with the fabricated
tag.
Secondly, the realistic deployment of the JPP mechanism is largely restricted by
the so called monopolistic key assignment model, in which a monopoly (typically
the manufacturer of the goods) pre-assigns all the keys (shares) to the tags
according a ﬁxed secret sharing scheme with conjectured parameters. Under this
assumption, the monopoly has to know or predict much detailed information
on how goods are de-packed and re-packed by the downstream parties along a
supply chain. If the threshold of the secret sharing scheme is set to be too large,
it is possible that the batch size becomes smaller than the threshold so that a
valid downstream party cannot promptly collect enough shares to recover the
key k. If the threshold is set to be too small (so that all supply chain parties can
easily collect enough shares), it may also be easier for an adversary to collect
enough shares, especially in upstream supply chains. Without the knowledge
that is either not known, or hard to predict, and subject to uninformed changes,
a proper threshold is hard, if not impossible, to be decided. Thus, this one-size-
fits-all solution is not ﬂexibly applicable.
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In the unidirectional supply chain channel, no one has better knowledge on
how to de-pack and re-pack the tagged goods than the current owner. As in
our running example shown in Fig. 1, a 10 × 10 case, in which all the tags can
be originally assigned with shares by a (33, 100)-TSS scheme, is de-packed and
re-packed into smaller cases by the current owner such that the tags in a 3 × 3
case can be re-assigned with secret shares by a (3, 9)-TSS scheme, and the tags
in a 6×6 case with shares by a (12, 36)-TSS scheme. It is highly demanded that
this current owner be able to update the tags according to the status quo. We
thus promote a ﬂexible unidirectional key distribution scheme in RFID-enabled
supply chains, where an intermediate supply chain party can ﬂexibly and securely
update the secrets (or shares) on the tags that are currently in processing, with
some secret update protocol as proposed below.
3.2 The Secret Update Protocol
In order to solve the security and ﬂexibility problems of the JPP mechanism
while maintaining its merits, we propose a ﬂexible and secure secret update
protocol as an enhancement of the JPP mechanism. The purpose is to change
the tag message (Si,Mi) by each supply chain party to prevent the tracking and
counterfeiting across supply chain parties; the secret update protocol may also
change the parameters of the secret sharing scheme to adapt to the changes in
collection size in supply chains.
A tag must verify the validity of the reader when executing the secret update
protocol, or else any malicious reader can rewrite the tag. In the JPP mechanism,
the only diﬀerence between the valid reader and unauthorized reader is the valid
reader can recover the key k. Consequently, a tag can verify the reader’s validity
by checking the reader’s possession of k.
We realize the reader authentication by adding a value ci = h(k‖Si) on the
tag, where h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l is a one-way hash function, and l is the security
parameter of the system 2. In our scheme, ci is used by the tag Ti to authenticate
the reader. The secret update protocol updates all the values stored on the tag,
namely (Si,Mi, ci), to a set of new values (S′i,M
′
i , c
′
i). The requirement on tags is
that the tags should have the ability to perform hash functions and have slightly
more storage than the JPP mechanism to store ci. This is the price to pay for
the enhanced security and functionality.
Before the secret update protocol is launched by a reader, the reader is as-
sumed to have recovered the key k with enough shares. It is also assumed that
the reader has chosen a new key k′ and split it using a pre-chosen secret sharing
scheme with new parameters (τ ′, n′), where typically τ ′ ≤ τ and n′ ≤ n for tags
moving towards downstream supply chain. The secret update protocol is shown
in Fig. 2 and described in the following.
1. Reader←→ Tag: The reader ﬁrst identiﬁes the tag Ti based on the recov-
ered key k and the shared secret ci, with any privacy-enhanced
2 The length of (S′i‖M ′i) is supposed to be 96 bits in [4], then we set l to be 96 bits.
Refer to Section 3.5 for more discussions on the implementation issues.
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Reader Tag Ti
[k,k′] [Si, Mi, ci = h(k||Si)]
Prepare new key k′; Identify the tag Ti;
Prepare new share S′i for Ti;
Private Tag Authentication
Compute ci = h(k||Si), c′i = h(k′||S′i),
A = (S′i‖M ′i)⊕ h(′0′‖ci),
B = c′i ⊕ h(′1′‖ci),
and C = h(ci‖S′i‖M ′i‖c′i). A, B, C
Compute S′i‖M ′i = A⊕ h(′0′‖ci);
Compute c′i = B ⊕ h(′1′‖ci);
if C = h(ci‖S′i‖M ′i‖c′i),then
Si ← S′i,
Mi ← M ′i ,
ci ← c′i.
Fig. 2. The Secret Update Protocol
authentication protocol3. Once the tag is authenticated, the reader is ready
to prepare the new secret share for the tag’s updating.
2. Reader −→ Tag: The reader then computes ci = h(k||Si), and assigns an
unused share S′i (of the new key k
′) to Ti. The reader calculates c′i = h(k
′||S′i),
A = (S′i‖M ′i) ⊕ h(′0′‖ci), B = c′i ⊕ h(′1′‖ci), C = h(ci‖S′i‖M ′i‖c′i). Finally,
the reader sends (A,B,C) to Ti.
3. Tag: After receiving (A,B,C) from the reader, Ti computes S′i‖M ′i =
A ⊕ h(′0′‖ci), c′i = B ⊕ h(′1′‖ci). If C = h(ci‖S′i‖M ′i‖c′i), the reader is
authenticated. Then Ti updates its values to be Si = S′i, Mi = M
′
i and
ci = c′i.
To make sure that a tag is updated successfully, the reader can identify the
tag after the updating process. Recall that in the JPP mechanism, a tag Ti
always sends the same reply (Si,Mi) to the reader who queries it. The reader
does not authenticate the tag; thus, an adversary can easily forge a tag by
replaying the reply message. In comparison, our secret update protocol restricts
this counterfeiting problem from propagating to diﬀerent supply chain parties,
it can be further strengthened to solve the problem even within a supply chain
party’s territory. To achieve this goal, the ﬁrst step of the secret update protocol
can be any privacy-enhanced tag authentication protocol. For instance, a typical
challenge-response tag authentication protocol could be as follows: First, a reader
sends its query together with a fresh random number r1 to a tag. Second, the tag
3 To propose any new private tag authentication protocol is not our major intention
in this paper. As an example, a typical challenge-response protocol is described in
the following paragraph. Note that if performance is the primary goal, a tag could
be quickly identiﬁed without being privately authenticated by solely presenting its
identiﬁer.
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Ti generates a fresh random number r2 and replies (r2, D) to the reader, where
D = h(r1‖r2‖ci). The reader veriﬁes the value of D based on its knowledge on
ci of Ti. Below we discuss the security, performance and implementation aspects
of our protocol.
3.3 Security Properties
We list several primary security goals which are desired in a secret update pro-
tocol, and discuss how they are achieved in our protocol.
Authoritative access to tags. The security of the secret update protocol re-
lies on the conﬁdentiality of ci. Given an update message (A,B,C), only the
one who knows the value of ci can obtain the values of S′i, M
′
i and c
′
i. With-
out knowing ci, an adversary cannot forge a valid message (A′, B′, C′) due
to the security property of the hash function. Thus, unauthorized readers
cannot update the tags’ secret.
Authenticity of tags. In our updating protocol, the tag Ti is authenticatedwith
any privacy-enhanced authentication scheme (E.g., the challenge-response
protocol, where Di, the authentication message, can be veriﬁed only with the
knowledge of ci). The JPP mechanism does not provide tag authenticity since
the tag always sends static reply to any query. Thus, our secret update proto-
col solves the counterfeiting problem.
Forward security. In our secret update protocol, the tag Ti is updated with
new values (S′i,M
′
i , c
′
i), which are totally independent from its previous val-
ues (Si,Mi, ci). Therefore, the protocol achieves forward secrecy for the tags’
content in previous periods.
Untraceability. The JPP mechanism cannot resist tracking attacks, as the tag
always sends static values Si and Mi to any reader who queries it. Our se-
cret update protocol provides the anti-tracking property by updating a tag’s
secret to a new value, thus an attacker is not able to link the values before
and after the updating operation to the same tag (with the assumption that
the updating messages are secure against eavesdropping, while an adversary
is allowed to track a tag before and after the updating protocol). Note that
even if an adversary eavesdrops the updating messages, as long as s/he can-
not correlate the messages before and after the updating, s/he still cannot
track a tag in diﬀerent periods. However, if an active adversary is able to
monitor the update process and query a tag immediately before and after
its updating, s/he can track the tag by correlating Si and S′i. Note that such
correlation is diﬃcult to achieve in practice because the limited radio fre-
quency range makes the protocol operate in a relatively secure environment,
especially when update is performed.
Besides the enhancement of the security level, our secret update protocol solves
the reassembly issue since the current owner of a tag can write new values
(S′i,M
′
i) into the tag according to new secret sharing parameters (τ
′, n′). Thus,
a downstream party may ﬂexibly choose τ ′ < τ and n′ < n for the convenience of
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processing smaller batches of tags required in dynamic supply chain environment.
The formal proof on the privacy of the tags can be found in Section 4.
3.4 Comparisons
Above we mentioned that secret sharing approaches present a new research di-
rection on solving the key distribution problem in RFID-enabled supply chains.
Their advantage can be demonstrated by comparing with several existing RFID
authentication protocols that are selected to be classical and representative un-
der a coarse classiﬁcation. We list the major security and performance metrics
of these schemes and compare our solution with them in Table 1.
Table 1. Security and Performance Comparisons
Requirement for Resistance to Resistance to Complexity in
Key Distribution Tracking Counterfeiting Online Identiﬁcation
Hash chain [12] yes yes no O(log n)
Hash tree [11] yes yes yes O(log n)
Pseudonym [10] yes yes yes O(n)
JPP mechanism [4] no no no O(1)
Our protocol no yes yes O(1)
From Table 1, the advantage of using secret sharing based mechanisms is very
clear, as they simply solve the key distribution problem which is considered as
a cornerstone of cryptography, and is also fraught with complexity in real world
applications, while traditional schemes [12,11,10] presuppose the existence of
shared keys between mutually trusted parties.
The hash chain-based scheme [12] is eﬃcient since the online identiﬁcation
complexity is O(log n); however, it cannot resist counterfeiting attack. In the
tree-based scheme [11], each tag stores logn secrets, in which logn − 1 secrets
are shared with other tags. It increases the storage requirement on the tags
and communication rounds between the tag and the reader, although it also
decreases the online identiﬁcation time to logn. The randomized pseudonym-
based protocol [10] assigns each tag with a pseudonymous ID, which is mapped
to a real ID stored in the backend database. The protocol can resist tracking
and counterfeiting attacks, but its complexity of searching a tag is O(n).
The JPP mechanism is the ﬁrst applicable solution that is suitable for sup-
ply chains and without the need for pre-sharing of the secrets. However, it’s
security level is not suﬃcient as mentioned above. Our solution enhances the se-
curity of the JPP mechanism with additional computational requirements that
are comparable with existing solutions, which typically require random number
generator and hash function on the tag. In our protocol, the reader can obtain
all tags’ information after getting τ shares to recover the secret k. The reader
also needs to conduct a private authentication protocol for identifying a tag.
Besides, each tag needs to store three values which are constant on storage.
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3.5 Implementation Considerations
In [4], Juels, Pappu, and Parno implemented a (15, 20) threshold secret sharing
scheme on Gen2 tags. In their case, for totally 20 available tags, a reader needs
to collect at least 15 tags’ shares to successfully recover the secret key and
decrypt the encrypted information. The implementation only employs the 96-bit
EPC memory bank of a “Alien Squiggle” Gen2 tag, of which 16 bits are used
for storing a single share and 80 bits are used for storing the encrypted identity.
Note that the shares are generated and written into the tags by encoding a secret
key into 20 16-bit symbols using a (20, 15) Reed-Solomon Error Correcting Code
(RS-ECC) [13].
Given this parameterization (w.r.t., |Si| = 16 and |Mi| = 80), our protocol,
replacing (Si,Mi) with (S′i,M
′
i , c
′
i), requires additional memory space for storing
c′i message (which is equivalent to 160 bits, if SHA-1 cryptographic hash func-
tion is used.). As such, we can not put them all into the EPC memory bank,
but put (S′i,M
′
i) into the EPC memory bank as in [4], and put (c
′
i) into the
“User” memory bank 4. Additionally, we comment that a typical EPC is exactly
96 bits, by applying a block cipher in any authenticated and encrypted method,
the encrypted EPC message still has 96-bit length. Hence, a share value (Si) in
[4] might not be properly stored in the EPC memory bank (although its length is
only 16-bit), but inevitably be stored in the user memory bank. Fortunately, un-
like the memory banks for storing the Tag unique IDentifier (or “TID”) and the
Access and Kill passwords, both the EPC memory and the user memory have
similar physical and deployment characteristics (regarding the password-based
lock, unlock, permalock, and password-based write operations on these memory
banks) according to EPCglobal UHF C1 G2 standard [2]. While the JPP mecha-
nism requires only write-once EPC memory, our protocol requires rewritable EPC
memory and user memory on a Gen2 tag. Such a (re)write operation is typically
allowed in a secured state on interrogating a Gen2 tag, which is transitioned
from an open state by providing the correct Access password. On implement-
ing our protocol, we indicate that the 32-bit Access password of a Gen2 tag be
individually derived from the recovered shared key k (e.g., we obtain the 32-bit
Access password by hashing the key k concatenated with the tag’s EPC code,
and then taking the ﬁrst 32 bits of the output.).
Moreover, in real-world usage, one has to determine the number of tags n
processed in a batch and the threshold τ to recover the secret key. Now suppose
the current owner in Fig. 1 receives a case of 100 tags, which are formatted with
(τ, 100)-TSS scheme. On choosing a proper threshold, τ can be set as the biggest
value (e.g., τ = 80) that is less than certain upper bound to maximally tolerate
(up to 20) reading or erasure errors; alternatively, τ can be set as the smallest
value (e.g., τ = 20) that is greater than certain lower bound to guarantee the
robustness on recovering the key with a minimum number (20) of tags. As such,
the owner can recover the secret key and then decrypt the encrypted information
4 Note that diﬀerent tag manufactures will produce diﬀerent form-factor Gen2 tags
all conforming to EPCglobal C1 G2 speciﬁcation [2]). E.g., a Philips UCODE EPC
Gen2 tag contains 224 bits in the user memory bank.
Enabling Secure Secret Updating for Unidirectional Key Distribution 161
attached with each tag. According to downstream parties’ requirements, the
owner can de-pack the case and re-pack it into several smaller cases including 4
cases with 4×4 tags and 1 cases with 6×6 tags. Similarly, a ﬂexible (4 ∼ 12, 16)-
TSS scheme and a ﬂexible (8 ∼ 28, 36)-TSS scheme can be chosen for these two
kinds of cases respectively, to either maintain robust recovery with minimal 20%
available tags, or tolerate about 20% of reading/erasure errors.
4 Security Proof
In this section, we formally prove the security of our secret update protocol. At
ﬁrst, we formalize the security requirement for the secret update protocol. Then,
we show that the proposed protocol satisﬁes the privacy requirement.
4.1 Security Model
We focus on the privacy property of our secret update protocol. As for the JPP
authentication protocol running between an RFID reader and a batch of tags, it
has been proven that in [4], it is infeasible for any polynomial time adversary to
learn the shared key of the tags if the adversary cannot get access to the replies
from at least τ tags. This privacy property is strengthened in our secret update
protocol since the shared key of the tags can be updated by each valid supply
chain party.
Informally, in the secret update protocol, there are two basic security require-
ments: (i) The former owner should not be able to trace the current owner. (ii)
Any adversary outside the supply chain should not be able to link any two pro-
tocol messages in diﬀerent periods (a period is the lifetime of a tag between its
being updated by two adjacent owners). A formal privacy deﬁnition is described
in the following privacy game of secret update protocol (Game PoT for short,
which is illustrated in Fig. 3.).
We ﬁrst give a formal description of an RFID system. In an RFID system,
there are a set of tags T = {T1, · · · , T}, a set of readers R = {R1, · · · , Rm}
and an adversary A. Each tag stores a secret which is updated when its owner
has changed. The RFID system is initialized and updated through a (τ, n) secret
sharing scheme [14]. To identify a tag, a reader interacts with the tag through
the authentication protocol π(Ri, Tj). When a tag is passed from one owner to
another owner, its current owner Ri runs the secret update protocol κ(Ri, Tj)
to reset the internal state of tag Tj .
As above, the Game PoT consists of three phases. In the setup phase, the
game initializes the RFID system. Then in the learning phase, the adversary
A performs a series of queries to enlarge its knowledge base about the RFID
system. In the third phase, the adversary A chooses two tags for challenging.
Then, a tag is chosen by randomly updating one of the two tags. After this, the
updated tag is given to the adversary as a challenging tag for him to distinguish
it from the original two tags.
In the Game PoT, the adversary A is allowed to eavesdrop the protocol mes-
sages (by invoking an authentication protocol π(Ri, Tj) between a reader Ri and
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Game PoT
〈Game PoT〉
Setup:
(1) Initialize a set of tags T = {T1, · · · , T}.
(2) Initialize a set of readers R = {R1, · · · , Rm}.
Learning phase:
(3) For any Ri ∈ R and Tj ∈ T , A may do the following in any order as long as
rk,pd + vk,pd  τ , where rk,pd and vk,pd denote the number of authentication
protocol calls related to tags whose data was encrypted by k in the period pd and
the number of corruption calls related to tags whose data was encrypted by k in
the period pd respectively:
(3.1) Make π(Ri, Tj) calls, without exceeding r overall calls.
(3.2) Make κ(Ri, Tj) calls, without exceeding u overall calls.
(3.3) Corrupt tags, without exceeding v overall calls.
(3.4) Corrupt any reader except the reader R′.
Challenge phase:
(4) A selects two tags Tp and Tq.
(5) Let T0 = Tp, T1 = Tq and b ∈R {0, 1}.
(6) the game runs κ(R′, Tb) and then sends Tb to A.
(7) For any Ri ∈ R and Tj ∈ T , A may do the following in any order as long as
rk,pd + vk,pd  τ :
(7.1) Make π(Ri, Tj) calls, without exceeding r overall calls.
(7.2) Make κ(Ri, Tj) calls, without exceeding u overall calls.
(7.3) Corrupt tags, without exceeding v overall calls.
(7.4) Corrupt any reader except the reader R′.
(8) A outputs a guess bit b′.
(9) If b′ = b then output 1, else 0.
Fig. 3. Privacy Game of Secret Update Protocol
a tag Tj) and to corrupt the tags under the restriction that the sum of the num-
ber of calls of the authentication protocol and the number of tag corruptions is
at most τ (i.e., the threshold of the secret sharing scheme) during the same pe-
riod. The adversary A is also allowed to invoke secret update protocol κ(Ri, Tj)
with restriction that it cannot learn the messages in the secret update protocol.
Note that this assumption is commonly used in most secret update protocols
and it is reasonable since the secret update protocol is usually executed in a
relative secure environment such as the warehouse of a supply chain party. The
adversary A is allowed to corrupt any readers (and hence to get their internal
states) except the reader R′ to which the challenging tag is presented.
The goal of the adversary A in the Game PoT is to distinguish between two
diﬀerent tags chosen by itself. The adversary may know the internal state of both
tags. But the challenging tag is chosen by updating a tag selected randomly from
the two tags.
Definition 1. A function f : N → R is said to be negligible if for every c > 0
there exits a number m ∈ N such that f(n) < 1nc holds for all n > m. Also, a
function f : N → R is said to be overwhelming if 1− f(n) is negligible.
Definition 2. The advantage of adversary A in the Game PoT is defined as
AdvA(r, u, v, τ, n, ,m) = |2Pr[Game PoT outputs 1]− 1|.
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Definition 3. We call that the RFID system is (r, u, v, τ, n, ,m, t, )-private,
if there exists no polynomial probabilistic time adversary A whose advantage
AdvA(r, u, v, τ, n, ,m) is at least  and whose running time is at most t in the
Game PoT.
4.2 Privacy of the Secret Update Protocol
The privacy of our secret update protocol relies on the privacy of the under-
lying secret sharing scheme. We now prove that our secret update protocol is
(r, u, v, τ, n, t, )-private if the underlying secret sharing scheme is (τ, n, t, /2)-
private. The following theorem characterizes the security of our secret update
protocol5.
Theorem 1. In the random oracle model, if the secret sharing scheme used
in our RFID protocol is (τ, n, t, /2)-private, then the proposed RFID system is
(r, u, v, τ, n, ,m, t, )-private.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we design a ﬂexible and secure secret update protocol as an exten-
sion to Juels, Pappu and Parno’s unidirectional key distribution scheme [4]. Our
secret update protocol provides desirable ﬂexibility so that downstream supply
chain parties can adjust the threshold in key recovery for the convenience of
processing smaller batches of tags. Moreover, the secret update protocol makes
it particularly diﬃcult for the tags to be tracked across multiple supply chain
parties. Compared with previous works, our solution is similar in that it does
not require a database storing keys of tags being distributed to diﬀerent supply
chain parties, while it is more secure against tracking and counterfeiting attacks,
and is more ﬂexible in addressing the reassembly problem. Although our secret
update protocol requires more powerful tags than the EPCglobal Class-1 Gen-2
tags, it is worth to pay for the enhanced security and functionality. Our future
work will focus on the minimization of the cost of tags in our design.
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